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Summary: People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The
present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the asso-
ciation between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal
and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made
more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction.
Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the ﬁnding that conspiracy belief
is associated with domain-general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The ﬁndings are discussed in relation to the association
between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal
relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
A conspiracy theory can be deﬁned as an unveriﬁed and
relatively implausible allegation of conspiracy, claiming that
signiﬁcant events are the result of a secret plot carried out by
a preternaturally sinister and powerful group of people
(Brotherton, 2013). Such theories are a prominent feature
of contemporary culture. Substantial numbers of people
believe conspiracy theories regarding the role of the US
government in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the death of Princess
Diana and the reality of anthropogenic climate change, to
give just three popular examples (e.g. Gardiner & Thompson,
2012; Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007; Williams, 2013;
Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). With the rapid spread of
ideas enabled by the internet, conspiracy theories are now
often quick to arise and spread in the wake of any signiﬁcant
event (e.g. Abad-Santos, 2013; Holpuch, 2013).
Conspiracy theories are sometimes regarded as benign or
even potentially beneﬁcial (e.g. Pigden, 2007). Yet, belief
in conspiracy theories can have detrimental consequences,
both for individuals and for the wider community. For
instance, people who believe that HIV/AIDS is part of a
population-control conspiracy are less likely to adhere to
treatment programmes or use preventative measures (e.g.
Bogart, Galvan, Wagner, & Klein, 2011; Bogart, Wagner,
Galvan, & Banks, 2010), and people who believe that
pharmaceutical companies are hiding evidence that vaccines
cause autism are more likely to refuse vaccination (Hilton,
Petticrew, & Hunt, 2007; Kata, 2010; Salmon et al., 2005).
More generally, exposure to conspiracy theories is associated
with decreased civic engagement (Butler, Koopman, &
Zimbardo, 1995; Jolley & Douglas, 2013) and, in some cases,
prejudice, radicalisation and violence (Bartlett &Miller, 2010;
Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013; Swami, 2012).
Given the prevalence and potential consequences of con-
spiracy theories, a social-scientiﬁc understanding of the pro-
cesses governing the formation, maintenance and transmission
of conspiracy theories is required. Until recently, conspiracy
theories have been largely neglected by psychologists. How-
ever, interest has increased rapidly over the last few years.
A number of recent studies have found relationships with
personality traits, including interpersonal trust, paranoia,
schizotypy, self-esteem and authoritarianism (Darwin, Neave,
& Holmes, 2011; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Stieger,
Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek, & Swami, 2013; Swami &
Furnham, 2012; Swami, 2012; Swami et al., 2011, 2013;
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). However,
correlations with broader personality traits, such as the Big
Five, are small and somewhat unreliable (e.g. Bruder, Haffke,
Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Furnham, 2013; Imhoff
& Bruder, 2013; Swami & Furnham, 2012).
A small handful of studies have looked at the role of
reasoning biases and heuristics in conspiracist ideation
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011; McHoskey, 1995). In particular,
conspiracist beliefs may be, at least in part, a product of a
bias towards seeking or accepting explanations that are
proportional to the consequences of the event in question
(LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007;
McCauley & Jacques, 1979). According to this heuristic,
mundane events may have mundane causes, but signiﬁcant
events require signiﬁcant causes. This bias can be explained
in terms of the representativeness heuristic: the automatic
assumption that ‘like causes (or is caused by) like’ (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1972; Teigen, 2004). As conspiracy theories
usually explain momentous events in terms of a proportionally
vast, sinister conspiracy, they adhere to the representativeness
assumption and thus may be more intuitively plausible than
rival explanations.
The conjunction fallacy
The representativeness heuristic may also play a role in the
conjunction fallacy. The conjunction fallacy is a speciﬁc
error of probabilistic reasoning whereby people overestimate
the likelihood of co-occurring events. The phenomenon was
explored by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Participants
were presented with a brief personality sketch describing a
hypothetical individual, Linda. The description was constructed
to be stereotypically representative of an active feminist and
unrepresentative of a bank teller: ‘Linda is 31 years old, single,
outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concernedwith issues of discrimination
and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demon-
strations.’ Following this description, participants rated the
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likelihood of a number of statements about Linda, including
three key propositions: (i) Linda is an active feminist; (ii) Linda
is a bank teller; and (iii) Linda is a bank teller and an active
feminist. Thus, participants judge the likelihood of two singu-
lar, constituent propositions (one representative and one
unrepresentative) and a conjunction of the two propositions.
Participants who select the conjunctive statement as being
more likely than either individual constituent statement have
fallen victim to the conjunction fallacy; a conjunction cannot
be more probable than one of its constituents, because the
former is necessarily a more restrictive set of possibilities
than the latter (however, see Gigerenzer, 1991; Wolford,
Taylor, & Beck, 1990).
Using several variations of the Linda scenario, Tversky
and Kahneman (1983) found that typically between 50%
and 90% of participants committed the conjunction fallacy.
These ﬁgures have generally been borne out by subsequent
research using a wide variety of conjunction scenarios
(Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Fiedler, 1988; Fisk & Pidgeon,
1996, 1997, 1998; Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk,
& Wiltshire, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wolford
et al., 1990). The effect appears to be strongest when the
conjunction suggests a motive or causal relationship (Nestler,
2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Tversky and Kahneman (1983; see also Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002) argue that the fallacy is a product of the
representativeness heuristic.1 In the case of the ﬁctitious
Linda, the objectively restrictive conjunctive description
(Linda is a feminist bank teller) may seem more subjectively
representative of the described individual and thus more
intuitively plausible than the singular, unrepresentative
(though objectively more inclusive) component description
(Linda is a bank teller). This reasoning deﬁes objective laws
of probability but satisﬁes the representativeness heuristic.
The conjunction fallacy and anomalistic beliefs
Anomalistic beliefs are those that defy conventional under-
standing of reality, including (but not limited to) belief in
the paranormal and conspiracy theories (French & Stone,
2014). The representativeness heuristic has been argued to
account, at least in part, for paranormal beliefs (Blackmore
& Troscianko, 1985; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Gilovich &
Savitsky, 2002; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Rogers et al.,
2009, 2011; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1991). In particular,
three studies have explored the relationship between suscep-
tibility to the conjunction fallacy and belief in the paranor-
mal. In the ﬁrst study (Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007),
participants were asked to rate the likelihood of various out-
comes of a local football match: (i) Team A score ﬁrst; (ii)
Team A score ﬁrst and win; (iii) Team A score ﬁrst and lose;
and (iv) Team A score ﬁrst and the game is drawn. Contrary
to expectations, there was no difference in conjunction error
rates between paranormal believers and nonbelievers. How-
ever, this study has been criticised on the grounds that the
sample consisted only of psychology students (who are not
representative of the general population in terms of statistical
sophistication), limitations of the measure of paranormal
belief employed (the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale:
Tobacyk, 1988) and the use of a single conjunction item
relating to a football match (Rogers et al., 2009).
Rogers et al. (2009) aimed to overcome these limitations
by controlling for participants’ training in statistics, using a
superior measure of paranormal beliefs (Thalbourne &
Delin, 1993), and creating a more sophisticated measure of
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. This measure con-
sists of paranormal-themed items (such as an apparently pre-
cognitive dream) and neutral items (involving, for example,
a case of food poisoning). A signiﬁcant relationship was
reported between belief in the paranormal and susceptibility
to the conjunction fallacy. Participants who indicated stron-
ger paranormal belief committed more conjunction errors
on the paranormal-themed items and also on neutral items.
The ﬁnding was replicated by Rogers et al. (2011). These
ﬁndings suggest that paranormal believers are especially
prone to the conjunction fallacy and that susceptibility to
the fallacy is to some extent domain-general, affecting all
conjunctive judgements regardless of context (paranormal
or otherwise).
The ﬁndings may reﬂect the tendency among paranormal
believers to base judgements on their subjective perception
of the representativeness of certain coincidences rather than
on objective probabilistic laws (Rogers et al., 2009). Believers
appear to look beyond ‘mere coincidence’ and instead attribute
an underlying causal relationship to co-occurring events
(Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger &
Taylor, 2003; Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002). The imagined
causal relationship adds to the subjective representativeness
of conjunctive events, making them appear more probable
than the component events (Nestler, 2008; Rogers et al.,
2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). For instance, if a person
prone to perceiving separate events as causally related were
to have a dream about an old friend only to run into the same
person the next day, they may attribute the experience to an
underlying paranormal cause. A person less susceptible to this
bias may be more likely to attribute the experience to mere
coincidence.
Despite the similarity between conspiracist, paranormal
and other anomalistic beliefs in terms of being unwarranted
and extraordinary claims, little research to date has investi-
gated whether conspiracy theories are associated with similar
psychological factors as other anomalous beliefs. However,
it seems reasonable to suggest that the tendency to fall victim
to the conjunction fallacy may play a similar role in conspir-
acist ideation as in paranormal beliefs. A general characteris-
tic of conspiracy theories is the presumption that ostensibly
unrelated events are causally related by a conspiracist narra-
tive (Keeley, 1999). That is, disparate details surrounding an
event are woven together and attributed to the machinations
of a conspiracy. To take one example, some conspiracy
theories surrounding the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy point out that the video of the event shows a man
conspicuously opening an umbrella moments before the gun-
shots. According to the conspiracy theory, the two events are
causally related: the umbrella was a signal to the assassin(s)
(Posner, 1994). The tendency to perceive conjunctive events
as having an underlying causal relationship may make
1 Other potential explanations of the conjunction fallacy have been offered
(e.g. Fisk, 2004), but exploration of these hypotheses is beyond the scope
of the current research.
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conspiracist explanations appear more subjectively represen-
tative of events in general and thus more subjectively proba-
ble than alternative explanations.
Studies suggesting that belief in the paranormal correlates
with endorsement of conspiracy theories (Darwin et al., 2011;
Newheiser et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami et al.,
2011) further support the assertion that similar cognitive factors
may contribute towards both paranormal and conspiracist
beliefs. Given evidence that the representativeness heuristic
may inﬂuence the adoption of conspiracist explanations in
other ways (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; LeBoeuf & Norton,
2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007), the conjunction fallacy
seems a likely candidate in the search for cognitive correlates
of conspiracist ideation. Finding a relationship between
conspiracism and the conjunction fallacy would add to the
small body of literature concerning the role of cognitive
biases in conspiracist ideation and would support the notion
that psychological factors that inﬂuence supernatural beliefs
may also inﬂuence conspiracist beliefs.
Overview and hypotheses
The present studies represent the ﬁrst examination of the
relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual dif-
ferences in susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. Using an
existing measure of susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy
(Rogers et al., 2009), as well as eight newly created conspir-
acy-themed conjunction vignettes, Study 1 tests a number of
hypotheses in a sample (N = 91) of the general public.
Firstly, it is hypothesised that, consistent with previous ﬁnd-
ings (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011), paranormal believers will
commit more conjunction errors than nonbelievers. Sec-
ondly, the hypothesis is extended to conspiracy believers;
that is, it is hypothesised that people who endorse various
popular conspiracy theories more strongly will commit more
conjunction errors. Finally, it is hypothesised that if the bias
is domain-general, as in previous research (Rogers et al.,
2009, 2011), conspiracy believers should make more con-
junction errors on all conjunction vignette types (conspiracy
vs paranormal vs neutral). Given the importance of replicat-
ing novel psychological ﬁndings (see French & Stone,
2014), Study 2 aims to demonstrate the relationship between
conspiracy beliefs and the conjunction fallacy using a generic
measure of conspiracism and an independent sample (N= 95)
of undergraduate students.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 91 members of the general public
(40 women; 51 men) was recruited from various locations in
London, UK. Participant age ranged from 18 to 73 years
[M = 35.0, standard deviation (SD) = 14.3; no age data for
ﬁve participants]. Most participants were educated to at least
A2 level or equivalent (79.5%). A substantial minority had
obtained at least A2 level qualiﬁcations in maths, statistics
and/or psychology (32.5%).
Design
A correlational design was employed. The variables of inter-
est were belief in the paranormal, endorsement of conspiracy
theories and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy in three
contexts—neutral, conspiracy and paranormal.
Additionally, for the purpose of replicating the analyses
performed by Rogers et al. (2009, 2011), quasi-independent
variable (IVs) were created out of the conspiracy and para-
normal belief variables by usingmedian split analysis to classify
participants alternately as paranormal believers versus non-
believers and conspiracy believers versus nonbelievers. Separate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) analyses were used to examine
the two belief-type variables. In the ﬁrst analysis, paranormal
believer type (believer vs nonbeliever) constituted the belief
group IV. In the second analysis, this IV reﬂected conspiracy
theory believer type (believer vs nonbeliever). In both cases,
the within-subjects dependent variable was the number of
conjunction fallacies of each type (neutral, conspiracy and
paranormal) made by each participant.
Materials
Conspiracy endorsement questionnaire. Conspiracist idea-
tion was assessed using an existing measure of endorsement
of various real-world conspiracy theories (Douglas & Sutton,
2011). The measure presents statements relating to various
popular conspiracy theories, including the deaths of Princess
Diana and President Kennedy, 9/11, climate change, the
European Union, HIV/AIDS, the moon landings, Jonestown
and the existence of aliens (e.g. ‘There was an ofﬁcial cam-
paign by MI6 to assassinate Princess Diana, sanctioned by
elements of the establishment’). Participants rate the extent to
which they agree with each statement on a 7-point Likert Scale
(ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’). In
addition, to obtain a more rounded evaluation of conspiracist
ideation, participants are asked to rate how plausible, convinc-
ing, worth considering, interesting and coherent they ﬁnd each
statement on 7-point scales (labelled 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very
much’). Responses to all items are pooled to provide an overall
conspiracist ideation score for each participant. Cronbach’s
alpha for the measure was high (α= .96).
Paranormal belief. A version of the Australian Sheep–Goat
Scale (ASGS: Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) was used to assess
belief in the paranormal. This is a widely used, psychometri-
cally sound measure of paranormal beliefs, consisting of 18
statements assessing acceptance of extrasensory perception,
psychokinesis and life after death as genuine phenomena
(e.g. ‘I believe in the existence of ESP’). Following Rogers
et al. (2009, 2011) and others (Roe, 2002; Thalbourne,
1998, 2003), a 7-point Likert response scale was used (ranging
from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’; α= .93).
Extended scenario judgements questionnaire. An extended
version of the scenario judgements questionnaire (SJQ) cre-
ated by Rogers et al. (2009) was employed to assess suscep-
tibility to the conjunction fallacy. The original scale consists
of 16 conjunction vignettes. Each vignette describes a situa-
tion, followed by three statements pertaining to the situation:
two component statements, plus a conjunction of the two.
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Participants rate the ‘chances in 100’2 that each of the three
statements is true. A conjunction fallacy error is made when
the third (conjunction) statement is rated as being more
likely than one or both of the singular constituent statements.
Of the 16 original vignettes, eight describe neutral events,
whereas eight were designed such that the conjunction state-
ment could imply that a paranormal event had taken place. As
an example of a paranormal vignette, ‘Leanne arrives home
late one evening after visiting her sister, who lives six miles
away, and goes to bed. Leanne rarely has nightmares, but this
night she is awakened by a particularly frightening dream.’
Participants are asked to rate the probability that (i) Leanne
dreams that a house is on ﬁre; (ii) a ﬁre breaks out in Leanne’s
sister’s house; and (iii) Leanne dreams that a house is on ﬁre,
and a ﬁre breaks out in Leanne’s sister’s house. Neutral items
pertained to the outcome of a horse race and the clientele of a
café, for example. As an example, ‘A group of students go to
a popular pub after a lecture. The pub is only a ﬁve minute
walk from the university and it is also close to town. There
is a beer garden outside the pub.’ Participants rate the proba-
bility that (i) it is a warm summer’s day; (ii) there are people
sitting in the beer garden; and (iii) it is a warm summer’s day,
and there are people sitting in the beer garden.
In addition to the original 16 items, eight new vignettes
were created for the current study, each with a conspiratorial
theme. The subject matter was designed to resemble typical
allegations of popular conspiracy theories, such as pharma-
ceutical companies, politicians and industries covering up
information that might damage their reputation. In each case,
the conjunction statement could imply that a conspiracy had
taken place. As an example, ‘Patrick works for a pharmaceu-
tical company testing the efﬁcacy and side-effects of some of
the drugs they manufacture. He discovers that one of their
widely available over-the-counter drugs is associated with
an increased risk of heart disease.’ Participants rate the likeli-
hood that (i) Patrick’s data were lost after an IT failure affect-
ing his computer; (ii) Patrick is taken off the project; and (iii)
Patrick’s data were lost after an IT failure affecting his com-
puter, and Patrick is taken off the project. Thus, the conjunc-
tive response option could imply a causal narrative in which
the computer failure and Patrick’s removal from the project
reﬂect an intentional cover-up orchestrated by Patrick’s supe-
riors to conceal the damaging evidence. To give another
example, ‘Josh has a doctorate in engineering and has been
inventing products and gadgets in his spare time for several
years. After patenting a few unsuccessful products, Josh is
now on the verge of perfecting a device which will increase
the fuel efﬁciency of any car by 500%.’ The response options
were (i) the CEOs of several major petrol companies hold a
meeting in which they discuss the implications of Josh’s in-
vention; (ii) Josh is found dead in his home before patenting
the invention; and (iii) the CEOs of several major petrol com-
panies hold a meeting in which they discuss the implications
of Josh’s invention, and Josh is found dead in his home
before patenting the invention.
An example (neutral) item (on which a conjunction error
was not made) was included at the start of the extended SJQ
(E-SJQ) to ensure participants understood the task instructions.
In order to counterbalance order effects, a second version of
the E-SJQ, with the order of items reversed, was created.
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their
gender, age, highest qualiﬁcation generally and highest
qualiﬁcation in mathematics, statistics and/or psychology to
date. Both general qualiﬁcations and qualiﬁcation in maths,
statistics and psychology were rated on a 6-point ordinal scale,
with the labels 1 ‘no qualiﬁcations’, 2 ‘GCSE level’, 3 ‘A2
level’, 4 ‘undergraduate degree’, 5 ‘professional/postgraduate
degree’ and 6 ‘other’ level of qualiﬁcation.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and completed the
questionnaire in a single sitting. Participants were initially
told that the questionnaire was a survey of opinions, beliefs
and judgements; the phrase ‘conspiracy theory’ was not
mentioned. Those who agreed to take part were given a
questionnaire pack containing an informed consent sheet,
the conspiracy endorsement questionnaire (CEQ), ASGS,
E-SJQ and demographics questionnaires. To control for
potential order effects, the order of the CEQ, ASGS and E-SJQ
was reversed in half of the questionnaire packs, and the different
versions were distributed randomly. Participants were instructed
to complete all questionnaires as quickly as possible; however,
no time limit was given. No reward was offered.
Results
Belief in the paranormal
Australian Sheep–Goat Scale scores were coded such that
higher scores reﬂected stronger paranormal belief, and a mean
score was computed for each participant (potential range = 1–7;
actual range = 1.00–6.11; median= 2.22). In line with Rogers
et al. (2009) and others (Dagnall et al., 2007; Wiseman,
1995), median split analysis was used to reclassify participants
as either paranormal believers (M=3.41; SD=1.02; n=47) or
nonbelievers3 (M=1.53; SD=0.37; n=44).
Belief in conspiracy theories
Conspiracy endorsement questionnaire scores were (re)coded
such that higher scores reﬂect stronger endorsement of
conspiracy theories. A mean score for each conspiracy item
was calculated for each participant by averaging their
responses to the six associated rating scales. Initial screening
showed that a large proportion of cases (24 cases, 26.4%)
were missing data for the item concerning the Jonestown
mass suicide conspiracy theory. In addition, several partici-
pants indicated in writing that they were not aware of this
conspiracy theory and so declined to answer. For these reasons,
the item was dropped. Some proportion of the sample agreed at
least moderately (i.e., had an average score above 4, the mid-
point of the scale) with each of the remaining 16 conspiracy
items (Table 1). A mean CEQ score was computed for each2 Although Rogers et al. (2009) employed a more explicitly frequency-based
estimate (phrased as ‘the number out of 100 occurrences’) in addition to the
‘chances in 100’ response format, their analyses showed no difference be-
tween the two response formats. Accordingly, only the latter was used in
the current study.
3 It would be more appropriate to refer to ‘moderate’ versus ‘low’ believers;
however, the ‘believer/nonbeliever’ terminology is retained here for conve-
nience, as per previous research (Rogers et al., 2009).
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participant by averaging their 16 conspiracy item scores (poten-
tial range =1–7; actual range= 1.14–4.79; median=3.02). CEQ
scores correlated signiﬁcantly with ASGS scores; r = .36,
p< .01. Median split analysis reclassiﬁed participants as
either conspiracy believers (M = 3.60; SD= 0.47; n= 46) or
nonbelievers (M= 2.30; SD = 0.51; n = 45).
Conjunction fallacies
Inspection of individual E-SJQ items showed that some
proportion of the sample made conjunction errors for each
of the 16 original items (range 5.5–53.8%). In addition,
some proportion of the sample made conjunction errors on
each of the newly created conspiracy conjunction items
(range 29.7–41.8%). Thus, all items were deemed suitable
for inclusion in subsequent analyses. A large proportion
(69.2%) of the sample made at least one conjunction error
for paranormal items (range= 0–8;M=2.04), a slightly greater
proportion (76.9%) for conspiracy items (range=0–8;M=3.01)
and a greater proportion still (87.9%) for neutral items
(range = 0–8; M = 3.12). The average number of conjunction
errors made by participants across all 24 items was 8.17, with
93.4% of the sample making at least one error.
Bivariate correlations were calculated to examine the rela-
tionships between the number of conjunction fallacy errors a
participant made, their belief in conspiracy theories and their
belief in the paranormal. The correlations are shown in Table 2.
Conspiracist ideation correlated signiﬁcantly with susceptibil-
ity to the conjunction fallacy overall and individually in all
three domains. The correlation with paranormal conjunction
items was slightly weaker than correlations with neutral and
conspiracy items; however, comparing the correlations using
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation shows that the correlations do
not differ signiﬁcantly in size (z= 0.88, p= .38). Correlations
between paranormal belief and conjunction errors were slightly
smaller and failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance; however, the
correlations overall and with neutral and paranormal-themed
conjunction items approached signiﬁcance (p = .06, p = .08
and p= .06, respectively).
In addition, to reproduce the type of analysis performed by
Rogers et al. (2009, 2011), two separate ANOVA tests were
used to investigate paranormal beliefs and conspiracist
beliefs in relation to susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy.
Contrary to Rogers et al. (2009) but consistent with previous
ﬁndings (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), level of highest
qualiﬁcation in maths, statistics and/or psychology did not
correlate signiﬁcantly with number of conjunction errors
made [r (89) = .16, p = .14], and so, this was not controlled
for in subsequent analyses.
Firstly, a 2 paranormal belief group (believer vs nonbeliever)
× 3 event type (neutral vs paranormal vs conspiracy) mixed
ANOVA was performed on the number of conjunction errors
made. Mean and SD scores are shown in Table 3. The main
effect of paranormal belief group was small but signiﬁcant
[F(1,89) = 5.29; p< .05; η2p = .06], with believers making
more conjunction errors than nonbelievers. The interaction
between event type and belief group emerged as nonsigniﬁ-
cant [F(1,89) = 0.87; p = .35; η2p = .01].
Secondly, a 2 conspiracy belief group (believer vs
nonbeliever) × 3 event type (paranormal vs conspiracy vs
neutral) mixed ANOVA was performed. Mean and SD scores
are also shown in Table 3. The main effect of belief group
emerged as signiﬁcant [F(1,89) = 9.90; p< .01; η2p = .10], with
believers making more conjunction errors than nonbelievers.
Table 1. Average endorsement of conspiracy theories (i.e. proportion scoring above the mid-point)
Item (%)
8. Princess Diana’s death was an accident (% who disagree). 79.1
6. There was no conspiracy involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy (% who disagree). 54.9
1. The idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud. 42.5
3. The European Union is trying to take control of the UK. 41.8
4. The ‘science’ behind climate change is at least dubious. 37.4
10. Scientists are creating panic about climate change because it is in their interests to do so. 28.6
2. One or more rogue ‘cells’ in the British Secret Service constructed and carried out a plot to kill Princess Diana. 26.7
17. Governments are suppressing evidence of the existence of aliens. 23.3
13. The American moon landings were faked. 21.1
9. The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory. 19.8
5. There was an ofﬁcial campaign by MI6 to assassinate Princess Diana, sanctioned by elements of the establishment. 16.7
7. ‘Climate change’ is a myth promoted by the government as an excuse to raise taxes and curb people’s freedom. 16.5
11. The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist action but a governmental conspiracy. 15.6
14. Princess Diana had to be killed because the British government could not accept that the mother of the future king was
involved with a Muslim Arab.
14.6
12. Business enemies of Dodi Fayed and his father Mohammed Al Fayed assassinated Dodi, with the death of Princess
Diana a cover-up for their operation.
7.9
15. A governmental exercise was behind the suicide at Jonestown. 7.5
16. Princess Diana faked her own death so she and Dodi could retreat into isolation. 4.4
Table 2. Correlations between conspiracist ideation, belief in the
paranormal and number of conjunction errors
Belief type
Conjunction type Conspiracy Paranormal
Neutral .36** .19
Paranormal .24* .20
Conspiracy .36** .13
Overall .37** .20
Note: N= 91.
**Correlation is signiﬁcant at the level p< .01.
*Correlation is signiﬁcant at the level p< .05.
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The interaction between event type and belief group emerged
as nonsigniﬁcant [F(1,89) = 0.26; p= .77; η2p = .00].
As the same participants contributed to both analyses,
both ANOVAs produced a signiﬁcant main effect of con-
junction event type [F(2, 178) = 16.48; p< .001; η2p = .16].
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons between the
three event types showed a signiﬁcant difference between
paranormal and neutral event types [t(90) = 5.26, p< .01],
with participants generally making more errors on neutral
items than paranormal items. A signiﬁcant difference was
also found between conspiracy items and paranormal items
[t(90) = 4.69, p< .01], with participants making more errors
on conspiracy items than paranormal items. The difference
between conspiracy items and neutral items was nonsigniﬁ-
cant [t(90) = 0.56, p = .58]; that is, conspiracy and neutral
items evoked similar number of conjunction fallacy errors.
Discussion
The current ﬁndings partially replicated previous research
showing that people with stronger belief in the paranormal
tend to make more conjunction fallacy errors (Rogers et al.,
2009, 2011). Bivariate correlations between paranormal be-
lief and conjunction errors in certain contexts were positive
but small, only bordering on statistical signiﬁcance. How-
ever, a signiﬁcant relationship did emerge from the type of
ANOVA analysis used by the original researchers. Given
that the relationship observed in the current study was in
the same direction and of a comparable size to that observed
in previous research (Rogers et al., 2011), it seems appropri-
ate to view the current ﬁndings as a qualiﬁed replication. The
failure of the correlations to reach statistical signiﬁcance may
be a product of the smaller sample size employed by the cur-
rent study.
Importantly, the present ﬁndings suggest that there may be
a stronger, more reliable relationship between susceptibility
to the conjunction fallacy and conspiracist ideation; people
who indicated stronger endorsement of various popular con-
spiracy theories committed more conjunction fallacy errors
across all three conjunction contexts.
In addition and consistent with previous ﬁndings (Rogers
et al., 2009, 2011), participants on the whole made fewer
errors on paranormal-themed items as compared with neutral
or conspiracy-themed items. This implies that, in general,
contextual factors can inﬂuence the strength of conjunction
biases. Somewhat unexpectedly, there was no difference in
conjunction error rate between neutral and conspiracy-
themed items—both invoked more conjunction errors than
paranormal items. A possible explanation for this pattern of
results is that paranormal explanations clearly violate
common understandings of reality, and so, people are more
hesitant to adopt a paranormal attribution (see Lupfer &
Layman, 1996). Allegations of conspiracy, on the other hand,
do not contradict the laws of physics. Most conspiracy
theories depart from reality in more subtle ways, such as in
postulating preternaturally competent conspirators (Bale, 2007;
Keeley, 1999).
At any rate, such contextual factors do not appear to dif-
ferentially affect believers versus nonbelievers. Paranormal
believers demonstrated a consistently greater rate of con-
junction violations as compared with nonbelievers across
all three conjunction item types, not only paranormal items.
Similarly, the correlations between conspiracism and each
of the conjunction event types did not signiﬁcantly differ in
size; that is, conspiracist beliefs were associated with more
conjunction errors consistently across all conjunction item
types—the effect was not limited to conspiratorial items.
This implies that individual differences in susceptibility to
the conjunction fallacy are domain-general. It does not seem
to be the case that some unique feature of conspiracist
narratives preferentially invokes the fallacy in conspiracy
believers. Rather, it seems that individuals who are prone to
making conjunction errors in general are more accepting of
conspiracy theories, perhaps because such theories often rely
on a conﬂuence of events being subsumed under a singular
narrative. In this way, conspiracy theories may appear more
representative of events in general to individuals who typi-
cally perceive conjunctions as being more representative than
singular events.
Overall, the current ﬁndings are largely consistent with the
hypothesis that individual differences in susceptibility to the
representativeness heuristic and the conjunction fallacy in
particular may inﬂuence the formation or maintenance of
anomalous beliefs. The signiﬁcant correlation between
conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs observed in
the present study, as well as previous research (Darwin
et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011),
adds support to the idea that similar factors give rise to both
kinds of anomalous belief.
Some limitations are worth noting. Examination of
endorsement ratings for the various conspiracy theories raises
some potential issues of concern regarding the measurement
Table 3. Mean number of conjunction fallacy errors by belief type, event type and overall
Paranormal belief Conspiracy belief
Overall (N= 91)
Nonbelievers Believers Nonbelievers Believers
(n= 44) (n= 47) (n= 45) (n= 46)
Event type M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Neutral 2.47 2.27 3.73 1.74 2.65 1.96 3.59 2.14 3.12 2.10
Paranormal 1.62 2.20 2.42 2.07 1.55 1.75 2.51 2.42 2.04 2.16
Conspiracy 2.62 2.65 3.37 2.48 2.39 2.37 3.61 2.65 3.01 2.58
All 6.73 6.25 9.52 5.38 6.59 5.25 9.71 6.24 8.17 5.95
Note: SD, standard deviation.
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of conspiracist ideation. After reverse coding, a negatively
phrased item referring to the death of Princess Diana (‘Princess
Diana’s death was an accident’) scored the highest conspiracy
endorsement rating (that is, most participants disagreed that
her death was an accident). This ﬁgure is at odds with most
conspiracy survey results (e.g. Gardiner & Thompson, 2012),
as well as with the lower endorsement ﬁgures for other items
concerning Princess Diana in the current study. It is possible
that the item is too vaguely worded. People may disagree
that the death was an accident yet may not necessarily
endorse a conspiratorial explanation—they may see the
fatal crash as having been caused by the chasing paparazzi or
the reckless actions of the chauffeur. It is also possible simply
that the negative phrasing itself inﬂuenced participants’
responses in an unanticipated way. This illustrates the difﬁcul-
ties with measurement devices that refer to speciﬁc real-world
conspiracy theories, where item wording may inﬂuence
responses in unintended ways4 (see Brotherton, French, &
Pickering, 2013).
Study 2 was conducted, in part, to overcome these limita-
tions by using a generic measure of conspiracist ideation. The
second study also employed a different sample population—
university psychology undergraduates, as is typical of most
psychological research—to test whether the relationship be-
tween conspiracist ideation and susceptibility to the conjunc-
tion fallacy can be replicated within an independent sample.
Moreover, bearing in mind the relatively small size of the ob-
served relationships in the current study and the importance
of replicating small and novel effects (see French & Stone,
2014), Study 2 also serves simply as a test of the reliability
of the observed relationship. Given that the relationship
between paranormal belief and conjunction errors appears
to be less substantial than that between conspiracism and
conjunction errors, paranormal beliefs and conjunction items
were not included for further study.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Ninety-ﬁve ﬁrst-year psychology undergraduate students
(76 women and 19 men) completed the questionnaire in return
for course credit. The majority were of British (63.2%) or other
European nationality (26.3%). Participant age ranged from
18 to 44 years (M= 21.1, SD= 5.3).
Design
As in Study 1, a correlational design was employed. The vari-
ables of interest were conspiracist ideation and susceptibility
to the conjunction fallacy in two contexts—neutral and con-
spiracy. Again, to reproduce the type of analysis used by
Rogers et al. (2009), a quasi-IV was formed by performing
a median split on the conspiracism variable, dividing the sam-
ple into conspiracy believers versus nonbelievers.
Materials
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013).
Conspiracist beliefs were measured using a validated measure
of generic conspiracist ideation. The Generic Conspiracist
Beliefs Scale (GCB) assesses the extent to which an individ-
ual believes that the kind of conspiratorial activity postulated
by popular conspiracy theories occurs routinely in the world
but without reference to speciﬁc events (example item: ‘The
government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its
own soil, disguising its involvement’). Participants rate the
extent to which they agree with each statement on a 5-point
Likert Scale (1 ‘deﬁnitely not true’, 2 ‘probably not true’, 3
‘not sure/cannot decide’, 4 ‘probably true’ and 5 ‘deﬁnitely
true’). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was high (.88).
Modiﬁed scenario judgements questionnaire. Susceptibility
to the conjunction fallacy was again measured by way of an
adapted version of the SJQ (Rogers et al., 2009). In the cur-
rent study, the eight neutral and eight conspiracy-themed
conjunction items from Study 1 were administered; however,
the eight paranormal items were omitted.
Procedure
Undergraduate students were approached to take part in
research following a lecture on an unrelated topic. Volunteers
were given the questionnaire as part of a larger questionnaire
package. Again, the word ‘conspiracy’ was not mentioned in
the information sheet given to participants prior to ﬁlling in
the questionnaire. The order of items in the modiﬁed SJQ
(M-SJQ) was reversed for half of the participants; however,
the M-SJQ was always presented before the GCB. Partici-
pants were instructed to complete all questionnaires as
quickly as possible; however, no time limit was given.
Results
Belief in conspiracy theories
A mean GCB score was computed for each participant
(potential range=1–5; actual range=1.47–4.33; median=3.00).
Men and women did not differ in terms of conspiracist beliefs
[t(93) = .83, p = .41], and there was no correlation between
GCB scores and age [r(93) =.07, p = .50]. Median split
analysis reclassiﬁed participants as either conspiracy theory
believers (M = 3.42; SD = 0.38; n = 49) or nonbelievers
(M = 2.41; SD= 0.39; n = 46).
Conjunction fallacies
The majority (93.7%) of the sample made at least one con-
junction fallacy error among the 16 M-SJQ items. The aver-
age number of conjunction errors made by participants
across all 16 items was 7.73 (SD= 3.89). Inspection of indi-
vidual M-SJQ items showed that some proportion of the
sample made conjunction errors for each of the 16 items
(range 17.9–64.2%). A large proportion (92.6%) of the sam-
ple made at least one conjunction error for neutral items
(M = 3.99; SD = 2.02), with a slightly lower proportion
(90.5%) for conspiracy items (M = 3.75; SD = 2.27).
Total number of conjunction errors correlated signiﬁcantly
with GCB scores [r(93) = .29, p< .01]; stronger endorse-
ment of conspiracy theories was associated with a greater
4 However, exclusion of this item did not substantively affect the outcome of
the previously reported analyses.
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number of conjunction errors. Looking at conjunction vignette
types individually, GCB scores correlated signiﬁcantly
(and positively) with both neutral [r(93) = .21, p< .05] and
conspiracist conjunction errors [r(93) = .30, p< .01]. Again,
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation shows that the correlations do
not differ signiﬁcantly in size (z = 0.65, p = .51).
As per Rogers et al. (2009, 2011), a 2 conspiracy belief
group (believer vs nonbeliever) × 2 event type (neutral vs
conspiracy) mixed ANOVA was performed on the number
of conjunction errors made. The main effect of conspiracy
belief group was signiﬁcant [F(1, 93) = 5.62; p< .05;
η2p = .06], with believers making slightly more conjunction
errors in total (M = 8.61; SD = 3.72) than nonbelievers
(M= 6.78; SD= 3.88). The main effect of conjunction event
type was nonsigniﬁcant [F(1, 93) = 1.83; p = .18; η2p = .02];
whereas slightly fewer errors were made on conspiracy-
themed items (M = 3.75; SD= 2.27) than neutral items
(M= 3.99; SD = 2.02) on the whole; this difference did not
reach signiﬁcance. The interaction between event type and
belief group also emerged as nonsigniﬁcant [F(1, 93) = 1.50;
p= .22; η2p = .02].
Discussion
As in study 1, the current study found that people who dis-
play stronger conspiracist ideation tend to make more con-
junction fallacy errors than people who are more sceptical
about conspiracy theories. Once again, item context did not
appear to inﬂuence the rate of conjunction violations. Both
conspiracy-themed and neutral items invoked similar rates
of conjunction violations on the whole, and conspiracist
ideation correlated positively and to the same extent with
the number of errors on both conspiracy-themed and neutral
items. Moreover, the size of the observed association was
comparable with the relationships observed in Study 1. In
total, these ﬁndings add support to the idea that conspiracist
beliefs are a product, in part, of a domain-general greater
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and thus perhaps
representativeness heuristic in general.
A limitation worth noting is that the power of the study
and particularly the ANOVA analysis may have been
slightly reduced by the lack of variation in GCB scores. Only
one scale point separated the ‘believers’ group from the
‘nonbelievers’ group. This is likely a result of the relatively
homogenous sample used. A stronger effect may have been
seen with a more heterogeneous group of participants in
terms of beliefs about conspiracy theories. That a difference
between the believers and nonbelievers group in terms of
number of conjunction errors made was still observed despite
the homogeneity of the current sample suggests that it is a
robust effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main aim of the present research was to test the hypothesis
that people who endorse anomalous beliefs and conspiracy
theories in particular are more susceptible to the conjunction
fallacy. Two studies, using independent samples and different
measurement devices, found support for this notion.
Consistent with previous research (Agnoli & Krantz,
1989; Fiedler, 1988; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996, 1997, 1998;
Rogers et al., 2009, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983;
Wolford et al., 1990), people on the whole committed a size-
able number of conjunction errors, regardless of the context
in which the conjunction was presented. The ﬁnding that be-
lievers in the paranormal make a greater number of conjunc-
tion errors (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011) was replicated using
the same type of analysis used by the authors of the original
study; however, correlational analysis taking into account all
of the variation in paranormal belief scores produced results
only bordering on statistical signiﬁcance. This may be viewed
as a qualiﬁed replication of the effect.
Crucially, individuals who indicated stronger endorsement
of speciﬁc popular conspiracy theories (Study 1), as well as
generic conspiracist ideas (Study 2), committed a greater
number of conjunction violations than people who indicated
lower conspiracist ideation. This trend was largely unaffected
by context. The conjunction error rate among believers was
higher to the same extent across neutral and paranormal-
themed conjunction scenarios, as well as conspiracy-themed
items. The only apparent effect of conjunction context concerned
the paranormal-themed items. Believers and nonbelievers
alike made fewer conjunction errors on paranormal-themed
items than on neutral or conspiratorial items.
Lower conjunction violation rates for paranormal scenar-
ios as compared with nonparanormal items have also been
observed in previous research (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011).
One possible explanation for this is that paranormal scenar-
ios are perceived to some extent as inherently implausible,
as they contradict mainstream materialist views of reality.
Consistent with this suggestion, previous research has found
that supernatural attributions are invoked less frequently than
naturalistic explanations (Lupfer & Layman, 1996). Conspir-
atorial scenarios, however, do not possess the same obvious
implausibility. Real conspiracies take place in the world
routinely. The kinds of claims commonly referred to as ‘con-
spiracy theories’ diverge from real, mundane conspiracies in
more subtle ways, such as in postulating preternaturally pow-
erful and evil conspirators, ignoring more plausible explana-
tions and distorting contrary evidence (Aaronovitch, 2009;
Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; Brotherton, 2013; Keeley, 1999).
However, it is possible that the conspiracy-themed con-
junction items used in the current study did not clearly differ-
entiate between mundane conspiratorial activity and the
kinds of implausible machinations postulated by typical con-
spiracy theories. The novel conspiracy-themed items used in
the present research were designed such that the conjunction
response option implied that some kind of sinister conspir-
acy had taken place. Efforts were made to ensure that these
items reﬂected the themes evidence in prototypical popular
conspiracy theories, primarily the covering up (in some cases
by lethal means) of inconvenient truths. The actors behind
the various implied conspiracies were the kinds of groups
typically guilty of such misdeeds according to popular con-
spiracy theories, such as government ofﬁcials, the pharma-
ceutical industry and secret societies. Future research may
seek to systematically vary the implied perpetrators or the
scale of the alleged conspiracy and its consequences to see
if such factors have an effect on conjunction violation rates.
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At any rate, the increased rate of conjunction violations
across neutral and paranormal conjunction items, as well as
the novel conspiracy-themed items, suggests that the rela-
tionship between conspiracist ideation and the conjunction
fallacy is reliable.
One possible explanation for greater susceptibility to the
conjunction fallacy among people who believe conspiracy
theories is that, similar with those who believe in the para-
normal (e.g. Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002;
Brugger & Taylor, 2003), conspiracy believers have a biased
conception of randomness, according to which coincidences
are rarely mere chance occurrences. Rather, causal relation-
ships are inferred, which render conjunctive events as more
subjectively representative and thus more plausible than singu-
lar events (Nestler, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Con-
spiracy theories often hinge on the idea that many disparate
and ostensibly unrelated facts are in fact causally related by a
conspiratorial plot. Thus, the tendency to perceive such con-
junctions as being typical or representative may imbue such
theories with plausibility.
Yet it is unclear whether susceptibility to the conjunction
fallacy causes or conversely is caused by endorsement of
conspiracy theories. Given that susceptibility does not
appear to be domain-speciﬁc and that another product of
the representativeness heuristic, the proportionality bias, has
been implicated in the formation of conspiracist beliefs
(LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007), the
former seems plausible. However, it is worth noting that the
two causal directions are not mutually exclusive: a reciprocal
process may occur, whereby a biased conception of random-
ness predisposes an individual towards accepting conspiracy
theories, which reinforces a worldview in which ostensibly
unrelated events have hidden causal connections.
As a general issue, the endorsement ﬁgures for the various
conspiracy theories measured in Study 1 are worthy of dis-
cussion. Conspiracy theories regarding the reality of anthro-
pogenic climate change were among the most strongly
endorsed. The theory that the AIDS virus was deliberately
created in a laboratory was also endorsed by just under
one-ﬁfth of the sample. Both of these theories have been
shown to have potentially hazardous consequences—the for-
mer in terms of intentions to reduce one’s carbon footprint
(Jolley & Douglas, 2013) and the latter in terms of sexual
risk factors (e.g. Bogart et al., 2011). The prevalence of
misguided and potentially dangerous beliefs makes under-
standing the psychological origins an important objective.
Thankfully, the recent surge in psychologists taking an interest
in conspiracist beliefs suggests that progress is being made.
Summary and conclusions
Under conditions of uncertainty, people’s statistical intui-
tions are often at odds with objective laws of probability.
In particular, people often misperceive the co-occurrence of
the ostensibly unrelated events as being more likely than
the occurrence of either component alone. The current ﬁnd-
ings suggest that people who endorse conspiracy theories
more strongly are particularly susceptible to this ‘conjunc-
tion fallacy’. Taken together with previous research, this
provides further evidence that conspiracy theories, similar
with other anomalous beliefs, are associated with reasoning
biases and heuristics. Thus, research into the psychological
antecedents, correlates and functions of conspiracist beliefs
may be productively subsumed into the wider framework
of anomalistic psychology.
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